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Circular Reasoning Is Not the Uroboros:
Rejecting Perennialism as a Psychological Theory
Glenn Hartelius

California Institute of Integral Studies
San Francisco, CA, USA
Efforts to present valid evidence for perennialist models do not withstand critical scrutiny.
One strategy common to most versions of perennialism points to perceived patterns in
reports of spiritual experiences, whether from traditional, clinical, or phenomenological
accounts as evidence for such an approach; the shortcoming is that these same patterns are
the basis for perennialist premises. Offering one’s premises as evidence for their conclusions
is circular reasoning, and does not constitute valid support for an idea. Pointing to
similarities between reports of spiritual or other transformative experiences is what inspires
perennialist models, but is not evidence for their validity. Careful consideration is given to
Wilber’s use of this and other efforts to support his integral perennialisms, with subsequent
consideration of Studstill’s mystical pluralism and Taylor’s soft perennialism. Perennialist
models are considered metaphysical because there does not appear to be any way to obtain
independent evidence with which these appealing notions could be validated, and the
authors considered here have not achieved effective solutions. However, a review of these
three separate approaches reveals some similarities in what may be a genre of perennialist
New Age religion.
Keywords: perennialism, mystical pluralism, soft perennialism, circular reasoning
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ntroduced into psychology by Wilber (1975),
perennialism has gained a foothold in subdisciplines
such as transpersonal psychology. While Wilber's
work has received extensive and substantive critique that
may disqualify it from use in scholarly contexts (e.g.,
Ferrer, 2002, 2011; Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013; Hartelius,
2015a, 2015b), new versions of perennialist thought
continue to be put forward. Some of these, following
Wilber, claim to provide evidence for perennialist
views. Yet, as with Wilber, these efforts typically rely
on circular reasoning to support metaphysical claims,
employ boutique descriptions of conventional terms, and
overstep bounds of logic and evidence, in service of some
version of universalizing truth. This paper will critically
review evidence for perennialist views as put forward
by Wilber, Studstill, and Taylor, and rebut claims that
there is valid evidence for perennialism. In this process,
common factors in what appears to be a particular genre
of New Age perennialism will be identified.
Wilber's Evidence for Perennialism
ilber has made various attempts to evade the
criticism that his system is metaphysical, yet

W

careful consideration of what might be called his integral
perennialism, suggests that the metaphysical speculation
at its core may be inseparable from this approach. Using
a blend of complex circular reasoning, ideological
conviction, and privileged knowledge, his perennialist
theories typically offer their premises as evidence for
their conclusions. While it is worthwhile to examine
reports of subtle phenomena associated with mystical
and spiritual experiences, and to consider whether these
might prove amenable to some form of crosscultural
inquiry that is less encumbered by the assumptions of
conventional empiricism (Ferrer, 2009, 2014), integral
perennialism is too flawed to credibly serve in this
role. Wilber’s integral theory, as a creative product of
the religious imagination, may prove appealing and
inspiring to popular audiences (cf. Hartelius, 2015a),
but it should not be advanced as work that meets the
standards of scientific scholarship.
Perennialism generally, and Wilber’s work in
particular, has been the subject of numerous critiques
(e.g., Falk, 2009; Ferrer, 1998, 2002, 2009; Rothberg
& Kelly, 1998). Prior papers have focused in part on
establishing that Wilber’s work remains perennialist
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in nature despite revision (Hartelius, 2015a, 2015b;
Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013). Here I develop the argument
that Wilber’s integral thought remains an inescapably
metaphysical proposition partially obscured by defective
approaches to evidence, and hence not a psychology in
any formal, scholarly, or scientific sense of the term.
Metaphysics has several meanings. In popular
usage it refers to topics such as esoteric teachings, based
on an erroneous translation of the term as pointing to
that which is transcendent or beyond (meta) the physical;
hence, metaphysical bookstores are commonly ones that
offer works on magic, the occult, crystal healing, and so
forth. This popular etymology is incorrect, since the term
derives from meta ta physica, referring to one of Aristotle’s
works that was located after (meta) his work entitled,
Physics; in this meaning, metaphysics refers to the topic
of that book, namely statements on being, existence,
and first principles (Gifford, 2015). There is also a third
relevant definition, in which metaphysics (2015) refers
to speculations that cannot be subjected to scientific
inquiry or empirical verification—a definition that for
most purposes conveniently encompasses the first two.
This last definition is the most relevant in demonstrating
how integral perennialism necessarily fails as anything
beyond an inspiring exercise in meaning making through
metaphysical speculation.
Within the field of transpersonal psychology,
perennialism (e.g., Wilber, 2000a, 2006) has moved
from dominant paradigm (Needleman & Eisenberg,
1987; Rothberg, 1986) to a more contested status
(Ferrer, 2011) in the face of critiques that it tries to
remedy the Western mind-body split by merely tacking
on speculations about a transcendent spiritual dimension
(e.g., Ferrer, 2002, 2009). In addition to Ferrer, other
critics have claimed that appealing to hidden or
undemonstrable causes makes this model unsuitable for
scholarship (Hartelius, 2015a), and have pointd out that
failure to resolve the Cartesian divide between mind and
matter, or subject and object, reduces its usefulness for
understanding mystical, spiritual, and other exceptional
human experiences (Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013).
Perennialism begins with a conventional
objective understanding of the world and attempts
to add an interior dimension that fuses conventional
psychological development with postulated mystical
and spiritual ranges of attainment; it uses this
approach for individuals as well as for human cultures
(cf. Wilber, 1979, 2000a, 2006). Resolution of these

largely incompatible objective and subjective schemas
is proposed by suggesting that they both emerge from
a nondual spiritual ultimate that is beyond sensory
apprehension; the existence of this nondual ultimate is
evidenced mainly by interpreting accounts from various
spiritual traditions as if they were all references to this
same ultimate, with the numerous differences in their
reports attributed to diversities of cultural situation.
Critics have noted that if this ultimate is
problematically taken to be the unchanging goal of
human spiritual aspiration, regardless of cultural
situation, then it has qualities that are consistent with
objectivity, even though it is deemed to be the source
of both objective and subjective aspects of the world
(Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013). One might imagine this as
a sandwich model reality: the top slice of bread is the
objective physical exterior of the world, as conventionally
described by science. Underneath this is a subjective
interior—the filling of the sandwich—psychological and
spiritual in humans but shared by everything that has an
exterior. Yet if one explores the depths of subjectivity one
arrives at the bottom slice of bread, the nondual ultimate.
One might say that a perennialist model
accepts the common notion that equates objectivity
with reality, and then redeems the reality of mind and
experience by giving it an objective source: a nondual
ultimate. However, this is only achieved by proposing
a transcendent universal cause. This move creates the
paradoxical idea of an ultimate source that is both
objective in nature and beyond the reach of scientific
inquiry, and subjects perennialism to valid critiques that
it is a metaphysical system rather than a scientific one.
Once his work had been called out as
metaphysical, Wilber initiated a series of revisions that
could be seen as attempting to retain his method and
his conclusions, but evade this critique. However, given
that metaphysical speculation supported by circular
reasoning and elite perception remains at the heart of
Wilber’s (2000a, 2006) perennialist model, it seems
doubtful that perennialism is possible without such a
strategy.
Beginning with experiential realities—sensory,
mental, and spiritual—Wilber posited that there were
regularities in the way that consciousness developed
within individuals and cultures. This proposed pattern
was his premise, his proposition, which served as the
basis for his conclusion that consciousness emerged into
the world from a nondual spiritual ultimate. So far, so
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good—much scientific work begins with the detection
of possibly meaningful patterns, along with theories of
what such a pattern might mean.
However, describing a pattern that is consistent
with a particular theory is not enough to demonstrate
the veracity of the theory. For example, in 2005, Bobby
Henderson sent a tongue-in-cheek letter to the Kansas
School Board advocating for the teaching of Flying
Spaghetti Monsterism—a theory that the universe
was created by an invisible Flying Spaghetti Monster
(FSM)—in school curricula as an alternative to evolution
and the Christian-inspired theory of intelligent design
(e.g., Dembski & Colson, 2004; Forrest & Gross, 2007).
At the time the Board was under pressure to include
intelligent design, and Henderson’s letter was designed to
illustrate the fact that once you open the academic door
to one metaphysical explanation, it becomes difficult to
make a case for excluding other explanations that are
equally without independent evidence.
One of the pieces of evidence offered by
Henderson in his letter demonstrates how simple it is
to use a pattern of observable facts as pseudo-evidence
for a favored theory. He noted that it was disrespectful
to teach his beliefs without wearing the chosen outfit
of the FSM—full pirate regalia—and that He (the
FSM) would become angry if this were not done. As
evidence for this claim he argued that global warming
and other natural disasters were caused by a decline
in the number of pirates since the 1800s, and offered
a graph demonstrating an inverse relationship between
the number of pirates in the world (declining) and global
average temperatures (rising). While this graph provided
evidence that was consistent with Henderson’s theory, its
intentional absurdity pointed to the weakness of such
patterns alone as evidence. Merely showing that there is
a pattern of facts that can be interpreted in a way that is
consistent with a theory is not valid evidence.
What is required to validate a theory is additional,
independent evidence. For example, in a noteworthy
coincidence, around the time that Henderson first
published his deliberate pseudo-evidence (2005), there
was a sudden rise in incidences of piracy in international
waters surrounding Somalia. While believers in the FSM
might argue with mock sincerity that this was because He
had been revealed to the world, this fact offered a unique
opportunity to test Henderson’s claim. By Henderson’s
logic, it would be possible to predict that this spike in
piracy would cause global average temperatures to fall—

which of course they did not. The point here is that in
order to validate the relationship between a pattern of
observed evidence and some theory about what that
pattern might mean, it is necessary to formulate and test
predictions based on the associated theory.
Of course, Wilber has offered evidence for his
model—evidence that comes directly from empirical
descriptions of experiential realities in the literatures of
psychology and spiritual traditions. The shortcoming of
this evidence is that it is identical with the material that
served as the basis for his premise. In place of obtaining
separate evidence, Wilber has taken the pattern he
claimed to find in various facts (his premise) and offered
it as evidence for his conclusion—a model of unfolding
consciousness arising from a nondual ultimate. As
noted, this is circular reasoning, a process that does not
generate evidence no matter how many times it goes
round and round.
Circular reasoning is a shortcoming, an obvious
and serious defect in evidence—one that deserves to be
faced soberly. All of the evidence typically offered for
perennialism—experiential reports, phenomenological
studies, quantitative studies using self-report measures,
religious texts, anthropological accounts, and so forth—
falls within this circularity rather than relieving it. All
of these sources of evidence are different types of reports
of experience, and as such are the basis for the premise
of perennialism; they cannot also be valid independent
evidence that confirms this premise. Nor can patterns
described within one such category be used to verify a
similar pattern perceived in another category, because
they are the same class of evidence. Claims to this effect
are akin to imagining that a hearsay account can be used
to confirm a rumor, when in fact hearsay and rumor
are both similar forms of information that require
independent verification. Given that there is as yet no
independent evidence for perennialism, claims that any
one of the categories of data is evidence for the accuracy
of perennialism is an instance of circular reasoning.
This fallacy emerges as a clear and potentially
fatal flaw to the perennialist enterprise. While it is
typical for proponents of such views to distract from
weaknesses in perennialism ingenious ways, circular
reasoning cannot be evaded or elevated. Not even
mystical images of circularity such as the uroboros—a
snake that swallows its own tail—will transform circular
reasoning into a numinous asset for perenniaism within
the context of psychology.
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An example of this circularity, along with efforts
to sidestep its weakness, can be observed in Wilber's
(2000a) introduction of his integral model:

In the same breath that Wilber (2000a) claimed his categories are “not the product of metaphysical speculation”
(p. 8), he outlined a process that constitutes precisely
this kind of speculation: identification of a hypothetical
pattern that is consistent with a theory for which no
independent evidence can be obtained. It matters not
whether the premise arises from abstract theory or
from empirical studies of experience, nor how large the
database of facts from which the pattern is deduced, nor
whether the alleged pattern was proposed by one person
or by a thousand; what matters is that one’s premise
cannot be advanced as evidence for one’s conclusion,
and tentative interpretations of patterns that cannot be
verified by independent evidence constitute metaphysical
speculation.
While circular reasoning is a defect in
argument, circular propositions are not always wrong. If
the premise is true, as evidenced by other means, then
the conclusion may also be true even if the premise does
not itself constitute proper evidence for the conclusion.
For example, if I claim that large stones weigh many
pounds because they are heavy, the statement may be
true even though it uses circular reasoning. But when
there is no separate evidence, such as the ability to
place a boulder on a scale, then the conclusion must
remain as a speculation—and speculations that cannot
be submitted to a process of separate evidence are, by
definition, metaphysical speculations. Since there is no
separate evidence for Wilber’s theory, other than the data

from which the pattern was surmised, his perennialist
theory—as well as every other version of perennialism—
necessarily remains metaphysical speculation. The fact
that other individuals in other ages and cultures have
noticed similar patterns—Wilber’s (2000a) so-called
“perennial sages” (p. 8)—confirms the appeal of this
interpretation but adds no evidence for the correctness
of perennialist speculations.
To draw an example from history, a similar
kind of metaphysical speculation has been suggested as
the inspiration of the cult of Mithras, a Roman mystery
religion that appeared around the 1st century B.C.E. and
survived for a few centuries (Ulansey, 1991). Around 128
B.C.E. the Greek astronomer Hipparchus discovered
that the astrological location of the Spring equinox—
considered the starting point of the year—had moved
from the constellation of Taurus to the constellation
of Aries. This phenomenon is now understood as the
precession of the equinoxes, in which the Spring equinox
rotates around the celestial horizon approximately once
every 26,000 years.
In the view of Hipparchus’ time, however, the
cosmos was centered on the Earth and immoveable; if
the cosmos had shifted, then this must mean that there
was a force greater than the cosmos, capable of creating
this shift (Ulansey, 1991). Looking to astrological
explanations, this move out of the constellation of
Taurus was interpreted as the end of the Age of the
Bull. Mithras, the slayer of the Bull in a Persian legend,
was apparently identified as the transcendent force that
was capable of moving the very cosmos in this way.
The cult of Mithras then sought to do homage to this
great power, the logical conclusion to an inspiring line
of metaphysical imagination. Note that the existence
of Mithras as a supremely powerful force was deduced
from the movement of the Spring equinox, and after this
force had been postulated, the movement of the equinox
then served as evidence of his existence. The approach in
this case was to posit a hidden force in order to explain
observable facts, and then use those observable facts as
evidence for the hidden cause. While this sort of circular
reasoning may be a perfectly fine way to found a religion,
its utility in science has yet to be demonstrated.
Given that it seems unlikely there can be
independent evidence for the correctness of perennialist
theories any more than there is for Mithras, integral
perennialism remains an approach inherently constituted
on metaphysical speculation—a shortcoming it is
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It should be realized from the start that these levels
and sublevels presented by the perennial sages are not
the product of metaphysical speculation or abstract
hairsplitting philosophy. In fact, they are in almost
every way the codifications of direct experiential
realities, reaching from sensory experience to mental
experience to spiritual experience. … Moreover, the
discovery of these waves, over the years, has been
communally generated and consensually validated.
The fact that wherever they appear, they are often
quite similar, sometimes almost identical, simply
tells us that we live in a patterned Kosmos, and these
richly textured patterns can be—and were—spotted
by intelligent men and women in almost every
culture. (p. 8; emphasis in original)

unlikely to transcend. One might argue that affirming
the reality of human spirituality is so important that
permitting metaphysics into scholarship in this one area
is justified. However, as demonstrated by Henderson’s
(2005) letter of appeal to the Kansas School Board, once
one such metaphysical cause is allowed, there is no way
to exclude any number of other potential hidden causes
and no evidence-based way to discriminate between
various theoretical agencies. Perhaps the stock market
rises because Nanabozho the trickster deity is pleased,
or maybe an earthquake in Greece was caused by Zeus
making love with Hera after a long separation. Perhaps
metaphysics are beyond the reach of evidence because
the Flying Spaghetti Monster wishes it so.
However, this critique addresses only the
process of discerning a pattern among reports of
spiritual experience and using the pattern as evidence
for validating itself. There is also the argument of
radical empricism, an idea proffered by James (1912).
James' vision proposed a sort of phenomenology by
another name, in which the world should be analyzed
as discrete elements of experience in relationship with
each other. He held that the relations between these
elements should be as important as the elements
themselves. He also held consciousness as an obvious
and necessary element in any experience, and in this
sense offered a system that spanned the typical Cartesian
divide between the experience of inner and outer.
While a Jamesian radical empiricism theoretically allows inner experience to be included as
empirical data, what James (1912) put forward was an
aspirational view rather than a ready research method.
Qualitative methods do study reports of personal
experience systematically, but these are subject to the
various ways experiences are reported by individuals
with different histories, educations, temperaments, and
different contexts of culture and language. Variation
may sit even more deeply, since environment may shape
not just experience, but the architecture of the brain
itself (e.g., McEwen, 2012). While radical empiricism
offers potential validity to inner experience, the task of
comparing experiential data across numerous traditions
in an effective and reliable way remains at very early
stages. This means that, as already noted, evidence for
perennialism remains reliant on identifying patterns
in reports of spiritual experience. As yet, neither
these perceived patterns, nor the reports from which
they are drawn, can be independently validated. The

personal experience of an individual may convince that
person of some particular philosophical or religious
view. However, experiential reports do not resolve the
problematic circular reasoning that currently underpins
perennialist views. Perceived patterns in such reports
serve as the basis for the premises of perennialism; these
same perceived patterns cannot be used as evidence for
the validity of such patterns.
Wilber’s approach, then, in simple terms,
is one of pasting together a collage of snippets from
vastly different contexts, describing patterns that he
has perceived within these, varnishing the results with
a coat of integral theory, and then offering them as
valid evidence for an idealized construct drawn from
these same patterns. This strategy has been identified
as characteristic of New Age religion, as described by
Hammer (2001):
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Bits and pieces of non-Western traditions are
disembedded from their original religious contexts.
Through an incessant bricolage carried out by
leading religious virtuosi, these fragments are reembedded in a modern, Western esoteric religious
setting. The principal mechanism of doing this, is by
forcing these exotic elements into a fairly rigid, preexisting interpretive mould. Thereby, to the believer,
the same message does indeed seem to come from
everywhere. (p. 56).
As an avenue of evidence, this is no more reliable than
what holds together a conspiracy theory, or reads signs
that an unrequited love is destined to succeed into
newspaper horoscopes or everyday events.
Transpersonal scholars such as Daniels (2001)
and Ferrer (2002) have pointed to the liabilities of
metaphysical positions, and Friedman (2002) has called
for a wholesale ban on these within transpersonal
psychology. While the latter may be impracticable in the
short term within a field that found its early and middle
footing on Wilber’s (e.g., 1975, 1979, 1981, 1984a, 1984b)
consistently metaphysical theories, a worthy first step
would be to acknowledge such musings as metaphysical.
To this end, it is unhelpful that Wilber has continued to
obfuscate the shortcomings of his perennialist model by
strategies such as distancing himself from perennialism
(Wilber, 1997), denying that his notions are metaphysical
speculations (Wilber, 2000a), and most recently joining
in the critique of metaphysics while claiming his work
to be post-metaphysical (Wilber, 2006)—stances that

depend on carefully tailored and limited definitions of
perennialism and metaphysics that inaccurately exempt
Wilber’s work from these categories (Ferrer, 2009;
Hartelius, 2015a).
In addition to acknowedging metaphysical
visions as speculative, transpersonal approaches can
also support advances by seeking independent evidence
for its theories (cf. Friedman, 2002, 2015). This is not
a facile call for objective empirical evidence, in the
spirit of debunkers who would marginalize or trivialize
transpersonal as unscientific or dangerous (Ellis, 1986,
1989; Ellis & Yeager, 1989; Kurtz, 1991; Shermer,
2002), or who would ridicule the possibility of any
human capacities that fail to conform to conventional
materialist expectations (e.g., Charpak, Broch, Holland,
& Randi, 2005). The phenomena of mystical and
spiritual and other exceptional human experiences are
often subtle and ephemeral events (Ferrer, 2009) that
require conducive inquiry methods capable of eliciting
these and being present to notice their character and
qualities, and perhaps even structure, without disrupting
(cf. Hartelius, 2007, 2015c). An approach that sees only
insubstantial subjective imaginings or else object-like
things that can be scrutinized under the harsh lights of a
simplistic materialism (cf. Ferrer, 2002, 2014; Strawson,
2006) may impose metaphysical assumptions commonly
embedded in scientific endeavors (Ferrer, 2014), thereby
prematurely dismissing these phenomena.
For example, if mystical and spiritual phenomena
are better understood as relational or participatory
processes (cf. Ferrer, 2008) rather than either just
inner experiences or external objects that conventional
approaches are designed to research, then such methods
may be inadequate—a shortcoming that may be
projected onto these phenomena. One would hardly be
surprised if a noisy expedition into wildlands failed to
find elusive species; it would be more disconcerting if
the explorers used this methodological shortcoming as
evidence that such animals did not exist.
Relational or participatory models may also
have value for psychology in areas other than the study
of exceptional human experiences; there is evidence that
long term outcomes in certain severe mental disorders
such as schizophrenia may be significantly affected by
cultural factors (Mehl-Madrona, Jul, & Mainguy, 2014).
If some mental disorders are in part relational patterns
co-created within culture, rather than solely biological
conditions requiring pharmacological intervention, then

approaches that consider only changes in chemistry or
biology or physiological structure may overlook other
factors that could be of equal value. Contemporary
research in medicine and psychiatry, which still focuses
primarily on object-like variables, might have as
much to gain from the consideration of relational and
participatory models as does the study of mystical and
spiritual phenomena.
What must be firmly excluded from the list
of conducive methods is the elitist notion advanced
by Wilber (e.g., 1984c, 1999) and members of the
traditionalist school of perennial philosophy such as
René Guénon and Fritjof Schuon, that the ultimate
evidence for their metaphysical schemas comes from
direct experiential apprehension of transcendent
realities. While there is no need to question the validity
of mystical experiences in themselves, the sensate
phenomena of the experience are not the same as the
meanings attached to them. If I am walking through
the desert in midday heat, the fact that I see something
shimmering ahead of me (the sensate experience)
does not mean that I see a lake (one possible attached
meaning). To claim that one can directly apprehend
transcendent realities is to conflate the particular
qualities of the experience with some specific attached
meaning, which may or may not be accurate pending
some sort of independent evidence.
For Wilber (1984c) this claim of experiential
validation was couched as the eye of contemplation, the
highest capacity of mind, that elevated one to knowledge
of realities that happen to be identical with Wilber’s
theories. In circular fashion, how much this higher eye
was open in any given individual seemed to depend
directly on how much they agreed with Wilber’s ideas.
While the eye of contemplation has disappeared from
Wilber’s (2006) latest major work, the argument of
privileged knowledge by elite knowers remains central;
this is an authoritarian argument by other means that
should not be confused with evidence.
In scientific research converging evidence from
separate lines of inquiry adds confidence to findings;
multiple lines of specious reasoning are not additive in
the same way. Metaphysical models based on reading
patterns into cultural or experiential data do not
receive additional weight or confirmation on account of
agreement by respected figures for whom authoritative
knowledge is claimed. Accordingly, Wilber’s integral
approach is a complex theoretical construction for
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which there is no independent evidence, rather than
a psychological theory in any conventional sense (cf.
Friedman, 2002, 2015). As such, it seems unlikely
to advance the project of recovering knowledge from
spiritual experiences, practices, and traditions for use in
the context of academic scholarship.
To bring this argument current, the error in
Wilber’s (2006) so-called post-metaphysical position
is the assertion that his process of circular reasoning,
allegedly confirmed or even constructed by elite
seekers, somehow constitutes “some version of ...
objective evidence” (p. 234); this evidence supposedly
places it apart from metaphysics and above the world’s
spiritual traditions. In fact it matters little whether
Wilber’s (2006) “Kosmic habits”—the alleged levels
of consciousness created by spiritual pioneers and then
“etched into the Kosmos” (p. 246) for future generations
to navigate—are pre-existing or co-constructed. The
only evidence for these levels is circular reasoning
and the opinion of supposedly elite knowers; there is
no independent evidence, and no version whatsoever
of objective evidence, for these claims. Wilber’s ideas
have been branded as metaphysical since at least the
1980s (Needleman & Eisenberg, 1987; Schneider,
1987, 1989), in the sense that they posit notions that
are not amenable to scientific inquiry, and no volume of
complex argument can obscure this simple fact. To raise
the stakes, as Wilber has done, and claim that this ad
hoc system of analysis creates results that are superior to
all the spiritual traditions of the world, is bold at best.
At worst, it fosters unsound and elitist approaches to
evidence for these phenomena (cf. Hartelius, 2015d).
Perennialist approaches, by their very nature,
posit elusive spiritual phenomena based on patterns in
observable data in the time-honored tradition of human
religious imagination. Their proponents follow in the
footsteps of the so-called perennial sages—not a tradition
as Wilber would rewrite it, but the visionary here and
there whose creative reach for a larger understanding
flowed in a similar vein as Wilber’s. Rather than a
universal truth gleaned by Wilber and his colleagues,
integral theory may be more of an ingenious synthesis
drawn from a hundred inventive seers and thinkers
whose innovations inspired, and continue to inspire.
These are gifts that deserve to be honored, but honored
as art and religion, not uncritically recast as science, not
elevated as an elite esoteric tradition, not touted as a way
to resolve science and spirit.
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Contemporary Evidence for Perennialism:
Studstill's Mystical Pluralism
and Taylor's Soft Perennialism
ince the development of Wilber's integral theory,
a number of additional authors have attempted to
advance new lines of evidence for a perennialist position;
some of these deserve brief examination to determine
whether any real advances have been made in identifying
critically sound evidence for such perspectives. Studstill's
(2005) mystical pluralism and Taylor's (2016) soft
perennialism will be considered here. Taylor's work is
represented as part of ongoing dialogue with the author,
and Studstill's has been selected because it delves into
careful and detailed comparison between two traditions
as evidence for its perennialist ideas. After this, the
outlines of a genre of perennialist New Age religion will
be offered.
Studstill's Mystical Pluralism
An inventive version of perennialism has
been advanced by Studstill (2005), who has attempted
to reframe his approach as essentialist rather than
perennialist—though it is both. Strictly speaking,
Studstill’s work pertains most specifically to the study of
mysticism, while the context here is that of psychology. He
has rejected strictly constructivist views on the grounds
that these define mystical experiences solely as products
of various contexts and deny any meaningful coherence
in such phenomena across cultures; this, in turn, strikes
at the reality of these experiences and undercuts the
validity of claims regarding their significance. Conversely,
if mystical experiences do reflect access to something
beyond conventional reality, then it becomes difficult to
explain their great variety. In seeking cross-traditional
understandings of these phenomena, Studstill has
acknowledged that intra-traditional views are inadequate
since these are constructed to serve the specific beliefs and
goals of some particular community; Studstill affirmed
that any contemporary approach of mysticism would need
to be couched within a scientific understanding of how
the human mind works.
Studstill’s (2005) mystical pluralist frame
proposes that mystical experiences lead to similar
transformative shifts in state of consciousness through
“encounters with the Real” (p. 20), where what Studstill
meant by the Real is his own particular account of the
nature of absolute, ultimate reality. Studstill's solution
can be summarized as follows: Mystical experiences

S
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disrupt the conventional egoic mental state and “induce
a structural transformation of consciousness” (p. 6) by
means of “an increasingly sensitized awareness/knowledge
of Reality” (p. 7). This transformation is a deconstruction
of cognitive conditioning that sustains an ordinary
awareness of oneself and the world, and cultivation of an
attitude of trust.
Reality, for Studstill (2005), is not an objective
transcendent dimension, but an experience of Reality
that more closely approximates its objective character as a
transcendent dimension. In this light, conventional states
of mind would provide a deluded reflection of Reality,
whereas mystical states would offer a relatively more
accurate view. The benefit of this view is that it affirms
mystical experiences as more real than the mundane mental
states of those who dismiss them as social constructions.
While Studstill (2005) has offered articulate
framings of inherent challenges in the study of mysticism,
his solutions are built on questionable definitions and
applications of key concepts. For example, for Studstill,
essentialism is the notion that things of the same sort
"share some type of common characteristic" (p. 8). This
broad definition makes it sound as if his approach to
mysticism should be seen as no different than grouping
objects such as books or clouds or mammals, which is a
considerable oversimplification. Essentialism claims that
some propeties are essential or necessary to an object,
whereas others are accidental (Robertson & Atkins, 2016);
other than in maximalist essentialism, which claims that
every property of an object is essential to it, a simple way
of determining what is necessary is to compare an object
with others of the same type. For example, if I have a red
plastic ball and a blue plastic ball, it is easy to notice that
color is not essential to plastic ball. Essentialism in this
example is a claim that shared properties in a particular
context are more important than those that differ.
Yet essentialism functions differently in various
philosophical frames. In the plastic ball example one
might add a red woolen scarf to the set, and then argue
that in considering red things, the red plastic ball might
belong with the red scarf rather than with the blue plastic
ball; in this context it would be redness that is an essential
property of the ball. Within a constructivist or relational
philosophy, essentialism can be a pragmatic, flexible, and
contextually informed approach to various ways that
different phenomena have something in common.
Essentialism functions quite differently in a naive
realist frame that assumes a separate and objective external

reality. In this context essentialism is a claim that there are
necessary qualities of an object or phenomenon that are
ontologically, objectively, and immutably true, regardless
of context or relationship to an observer. Since this claim is
conjecture, and cannot be demonstrated with independent
evidence, it constitutes a metaphysical claim. For example,
the experience of redness results not from an object, but
from how the wavelength of light reflected by the surface
of an object interacts with the cones of the retina, and how
neural signals from the cones are interpreted in the visual
cortex. An essentialist view of redness in a naive realist
context would claim that a red plastic ball continues to be
red even when it is in total darkness, or when bathed in
blue light that it cannot reflect—that is, that the redness is
inherent rather than the product of interactions between
the ball's surface, light, and a sighted observer.
Another characteristic of essentialist views in the
frame of naive realism is that they are at times justified by
appeal to the fact that the entire process of knowing, absent
naive realist metaphysical claims as criteria for evaluation,
would devolve into meaningless relativism (Nussbaum,
1992). Yet relativism, like naive realism, seems to assume
a world that is separate from the person or object, one
in which any relationship—or no relationship at all—is
possible; everything seems to exist, and every choice or
action appears to be made, in the interconnected context
of many specific relationships that have actual impact.In
this matrix, located decisions and relationships seem quite
capable of proceeding based on local knowledge—since
it would be difficult to argue that accurate, uniform, and
universal knowledge guides any great portion of human
activity. The fictive bogeyman of meaningless relativism
that naive realism at times uses as justification for its
retreat into undemonstrable metaphysical claims, seems
unconvincing.
With this background it becomes clear that
Studstill (2005) has offered a seemingly innocuous definition of essentialism as it might function in a constructivist
or relational context, but what he has applied to the
problem of mysticicm is a naive realist essentialism,
complete with an argument that such metaphysical claims
are the only alternative to a meaningless relativism. This
is not to say that Studstill (2005) has ignored possible
distinctions within essentialism. He has identified a
number of different types of essentialism based on
topics to which essentialism may be applied within the
cross-cultural study of mysticism: phenomenological
(similarities in mystical experience), doctrinal (common
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core doctrines), epistemological (revealing of a single
divine reality), cognitive (identical psychological
impact), and therapeutic or soteriological (effects are
similarly beneficial). While these distinctions may be
helpful, Studstill's (2005) identification of his work with
only epistemological and therapeutic esssentialism is
illuminating. Consideration of therapeutic essentialism is
beyond the scope of the present discussion; more relevant
here is Studstill's (2005) epistemological essentialism,
which is a radically metaphysical claim that all mystical
experiences "are nevertheless oriented toward a common
Reality" (p. 9)—a position consistent with a naive realist
approach, and with perennialist philosophy.
It is noteworthy that Studstill (2005) has
identified as perennialist only doctrinal essentialism,
which his mystical pluralism omits. Without argument or
evidence, he has separated epistemological essentialism—
which is central to his approach—from perennialism. Yet
if one considers the words of Steuco, who gave perennial
philosophy its name in the 16th century, it is difficult to
maintain this distinction:

In this description, the original author of the perennial
philosophy clearly included philosophical assumptions
regarding the nature of reality; indeed, perennialism
could hardly be a philosophy without these. If one
relies on any conventional definition of perennialism,
Studstill's (2005) category of epistemological essentialism
should also be identified with this philosophy, as should
his work, which is clearly perennialist in nature.
Having shown that Studstill's (2005) mystical
pluralism is a version of metaphysically grounded
perennialism, it remains to consider what evidence he
has offered in support of this project. The intuition that
there might be some commonality behind mystical
experience arises from seeming similarities: If there
are numerous accounts of some shifted relationship
to reality, are there then dimensions of existence that
can only be apprehended under particular conditions?
Even apart from potential spiritual value, the topic is
fascinating in much the way a mystery or detective
novel might be. The tantalizing premise of a hidden
reality rests on the same resonances that place these

experiences in the same category. What Studstill
has offered is a respectable yet selective account of
Dzogchen Buddhism and 13-14th century German
mysticism that emphasizes points of similarity in their
doctrines and accounts of how their practice transforms
consciousness. These similarities are then offered as
support for Studstill's (2005) mystical pluralism.
There are several problems with this evidence,
the first and simplest being that, as with Wilber,
Studstill (2005) has offered an articulation of evidence
for the premise as evidence for his conclusion, so that
his case is built on circular reasoning. Similarities
between traditions cannot simultaneously be grounds
for the premise, and the evidence that the premise
is correct. If I bought a used car and it broke down
two days after the purchase, I might suspect that the
seller had withheld information about its mechanical
problems. The car's breakdown would be the basis for
my suspicion, which is my premise. I could not also
use the same mechanical failure, or even a subsequent
failure, as evidence that my initial suspicion was
correct, without being guilty of circular reasoning.
I would need to find some other specific evidence in
order to confirm my suspicion in a valid way, such as
a note in the glovebox documenting that a mechanic
had diagnosed the problems leading to the breakdown
before the sale of the car. Any approach that appeals
to similarities between traditions as its evidence for
a perennialist model, including Studstill, is using
circular reasoning, which is insufficient in a scholarly
or scientific setting.
Nor does Studstill's (2005) appeal to systems
theory mitigate this problem. Complex systems do call
for more complex approaches, and he is not wrong
in noting that cognitive theory, as an example, relies
broadly on a computer metaphor. However, his claim
that the complexity of a system removes the necessity of
independent empirical evidence is incorrect. Cognitive
models are not merely constructed as metaphors and
then adopted, they are used to make testable predictions.
It is only when a model is able to predict in ways that
can be verified that it gains credence. Studstill's (2005)
mystical pluralism does not, and likely cannot, meet
this basic test.
An additional issue is that Studstill (2005)
has used argument for the existence of a particular
phenomenon—a cross-cultural pattern of change in
consciousness—as evidence of his explanation for that

Rejecting Perennialism as a Psychological Theory

International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 129

"Reason, as well as the proofs of many races and of
much literature, bear witness to the fact that there is
one principle of all things and that there has been as
such one and the same knowledge about it among all
men." (Celenza, 2007, p. 91)

phenomenon: that this similarity is due to a discrete
and objective ultimate reality revealed only by certain
mystical experiences that concur with his definition
of that reality. It cannot be mystical experiences
themselves that suggest this solution; rather, given the
great variety in which such experiences occur, it must
be that Studstill has correctly discerned which among
these reflect ultimate Reality the most transparently.
Even if one agreed that there is a uniform process of
transformation of consciousness across at least these
two traditions, this would not serve as anything
approaching evidence for the rather bold claim that out
of the myriad definitions of reality throughout human
culture and across time, Studstill's metaphysical claim is
privileged knowlege of the one version that is ultimately
true and correct.
Studstill's (2005) perennialist vision might be
useful hermeneutically for some individuals seeking
meaning in a therapeutic context. Other than this,
the fact that it remains rooted in metaphysical
assumptions, and that its efforts to provide evidence
for its stance rely on circular reasoning, are sufficient
to make it as unsuitable for psychology as Wilber's
integral perennialism. It matters little that Studstill has
labelled his work essentialist rather than perennialist,
or that he has done a thoughtful comparison of two
specific traditions; the flaws in critical structure and
evidence required for psychology remain central and
unresolved. His work offers no advances in evidence
for a perennialist model.
Taylor's Soft Perennialism
An equally ingenious version of perennialism
has been advanced by Taylor (2016). This has been
considered in some detail elsewhere (Hartelius, 2016,
2017), but a brief review is warranted here. For Taylor
(2016), the origin of all spiritual experience in every
human society and tradition is encounter with an allpervasive spiritual force that is the foundation rather
than the goal of spiritual development. This force is the
source out of which all the world arises, the essence of
everything and everyone, yet something that can be
directly experienced in expanded states of being. Various
traditions experience this all-pervasive spiritual force
differently, and come to name and describe it in a variety
of ways. This range of potential experience that underlies
and shapes the various traditions might be conceived of
as a vast landscape where there are many paths and many
destinations, but all arising out of engagement with this

all-pervasive spiritual force, which may or may not be
ultimate. Yet because it is separate from those traditions
that it informs, this force can also be experienced apart
from any spiritual tradition.
This is Taylor's (2016, 2017) openly metaphysical and perennialist explanatory framework for
the phenomenon that some individuals report durable
psychological transformations in contexts apart from
any religious tradition or spiritual practice—shifts
that seems resonant with some accounts of spiritual
transformation. Such findings are directly in line
with the intuitions of transpersonal psychology
founder Maslow (1970), who held the opinion
"that the common base for all religions is human,
natural, empirical, and that the so-called spiritual
values are also naturally derivable" (p. 4). Taylor's
(2016) approach is somewhat of an inversion of
Maslow's: he has claimed that a naturalistically
demonstrable phenomenon is partial empirical
evidence for a metaphysically-based spiritual vision.
A strength of Taylor's (2016) approach
is that he has set out to ground his concepts in
phenomenology. Among various weaknesses, some
already noted elsewhere (Hartelius, 2016, 2017),
are flaws in Taylor's approach to phenomenology,
and indeed to scientific processes of evidence more
generally. Phenomenology, in the Husserlian tradition,
is an approach that attempts to ground science in
the fully accessible appearances that occur in direct
experience—what Kant had termed phenomena—
rather than things-in-themselves, the more elusive
noumena. Husserl wished this to be a philosophical
method without prejudices or prior metaphysical
commitments (Pivčević, 1970/2014). As such, a
phenomenological approach typically requires that
one's preexisting beliefs or assumptions be identified
and actively set aside, or bracketed. This step is not
one that Taylor appears to have pursued with any
thoroughness.
For example, in Taylor's (2012) paper,
Spontaneous Awakening Experiences: Beyond Religion and Spiritual Practice, he examined various
terms that might be applied to the particular type
of transformative experience he was reporting on,
rejecting both spiritual experience and mystical
experience as too closely associated with religion.
Taylor (2012) found Maslow's term, peak experience,
more satisfactory, but then offered awakening
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experience as a "psychologically more neutral" term (p.
88). The difficulty here is that Taylor's term, though
less associated with religious contexts, is not neutral;
in fact, it is specifically resonant with his preexisting
beliefs that certain nonordinary experiences provide
access to a higher state of consciousness and a truer
perception of reality (Taylor, 2005, 2010), reflecting
his metaphysical commitments to a philosophy and
cosmology that he has not made any obvious efforts to
set aside. This is just the opposite of what is required
in phenomenology, or in scientific work.
There are many forms of phenomenological
research, but this example of Taylor's (2012) research
would appear to have been designed to confirm
preexisting beliefs about a particulary type of
experience deemed to exist across cultures; that he
did not identify and bracket his prior beliefs suggests
a lack of the rigor that would encourage confidence
in his findings. In this light, it is difficult to accept
Taylor's (2016) claim that an approach such as his
allows "a conceptual framework to emerge organically
from the study of experience rather than interpreting
experiences in terms of a preexisting framework" (p.
38). While Taylor's approach of collecting accounts
of a particular type of experience outside of religious
settings is potentially of value to psychology, an
apparent confirmation bias limits the reliability of his
research to date in this area, and raises concerns about
the psychological neutrality of his preferred term,
awakening experiences. To his credit, Taylor (2017a)
has acknowledged some of the shortcomings of his
earlier research and has attempted to address these
issues in more recent research.
Yet the failure of evidence for a perennialist
model is not dependent on Taylor's methodology.
Even if his phenomenological research practices were
impeccable, his findings would not serve as any kind of
evidence that certain states of consciousness are higher,
nor that they provide a more accurate experience of
reality—which by implication would seem to situate
Taylor's own type of nonordinary experiences as
privileged insights into the nature of reality. These
latter are metaphysical claims simply because it is hard
to imagine any empirical way of demonstrating their
validity. Taylor's (2016) perennial phenomenology,
as he has termed his approach, seems to argue that
because his phenomenological results are logically
consistent with his perennialist schema, they must
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constitute at least partial evidence for the correctness
of that frame. This is not the case, of course, since
any number of interpretive frames might be consistent
with the same empirical facts, not all or any of which
would be necessarily true; in scientific work, evidence
is held to a considerably higher standard.
Taylor's version of a descending perennialism
(Hartelius, 2017) may be inspiring as a meaning
frame, but it is not based on credible evidence any
more than other forms of perennialism. Despite these
problems, there may be some quite important human
developmental phenomenon that his work has touched
on. The fact that he has conflated evidence for a type of
experience with evidence for the metaphysical schema
he has extrapolated to explain such experiences should
not distract from the real potential value of this line of
inquiry. Perhaps Taylor's future work in this area will
be able to make a stronger contribution.
Common Characteristics of
Perennialist New Age Religions
aving reviewed three versions of contemporary
perennialism it becomes possible to suggest that
these share common properties. The utility of such a
characterization may be in aiding in the recognition of
this type of phenomenon, so that as new forms of this
genre are created it becomes easier to recognize these
as contributions to spiritual visions rather than to a
psychology of spirituality. Seven characteristics have been
identified as shared by the three examples: (1) an implied
claim of privileged knowledge concerning the nature of
reality; (2) a single dimension, experience, or phenomenon
as the source of all spiritual experience or goal of all
spiritual striving; (3) a universalized spirituality based on
recontextualized appropriations from spiritual traditions;
(4) other views or experiences characterized as distortions
of the one true view or one authentic type of experience;
(5) reliant on metaphysical claims; (6) evidence for a
particular phenomenon is advanced as evidence for a
particular explanation of that phenomenon; (7) key terms
are defined in nonstandard ways.
The first three of these can be combined into the
central vision of this approach to spirituality: revelation
of privileged insight into the underlying spiritual
nature of reality that provides for a true and unified
understanding of both secular and spiritual phenomena.
The subsequent four characteristics are necessary
correlates of this vision, strategies required and justified
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by its allegedly imperative truth. Taken together, these
features are recognizable as more reflective of a New Age
religious movement than of a psychology, or any other
scientific or scholarly field.
Wilber's version of perennialism is in some
senses a foundation for what has come to be called New
Age religion: systems of belief and practice that include
holism and interconnectedness, a unified worldview, a
universalized spirituality based on appropriation and
recontextualization of content from spiritual traditions,
an evolutionary perspective, a blurring of psychology and
spirituality, a focus on subjective experience, a mystical
idea of the inner self, and a belief in the imminent
dawning of a new and better era of human existence
(Flere & Kirbiš, 2009; Hammer, 2001; Hanegraaff,
2009; Heelas, 1996). Studstill's (2005) and Taylor's
(2016) works are also resonant with this genre.
Whether advanced in a psychology context,
as with Taylor (2016), or within the scholarship of
mysticism, as with Studstill (2005), or as a new form of
scholarship across multiple fields, as with Wilber (2000a,
2000b, 2006), these are more accurately described
as religious visions attempting to acquire scientific
credibility. In their locations as spiritual views of life and
reality these may provide inspiration and meaning. As
substitutes for science and scholarship, and specifically as
some component of psychology, they deserve a wide and
skeptical berth.
Transpersonal Alternatives
to New Age Spiritual Visions
he impulse to understand human spirituality, and
to reach for a grasp of what different individuals
and diverse communities may share in common or
contribute from their unique location, is a worthy
one—and it is only one of various things that a
transpersonal approach may aspire to study. For such
work there are a number of avenues available other
than metaphysics or pattern reading or authoritarian
claims: scientific methods (Friedman, 2002, 2015)
that include transpersonally-informed anthropology
(Laughlin, 2013), phenomenology and other qualitative
methods (Anderson & Braud, 2011), and participatory
research approaches (Ferrer, 2014), to name a few. Going
forward, some of these might usefully be paired with
neuroscience in ways that may bring fresh perspectives
to the latter; given the extraordinary sensitivity of neural
measurement techniques, it should be possible to gain
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valuable insights into how the body reflects complex
states, and to determine how spiritual achievements
in one tradition are different from or similar to those
gained through practice in a different tradition.
In addition, studies of beliefs or practices
situated within a metaphysically constructed cultural
context, that also consider their possible hermeneutic or
psychological value beyond that context (e.g., GiffordMay & Thompson, 1994; Lancaster, 2015; Miovic &
Newton, 2004), seem well within the scope of defensible
transpersonal approaches so long as metaphysical claims
are not intermingled with evidentiary claims. Were
Wilber’s integral theory, Studstill's mystical pluralism,
or Taylor's soft perennialism to claim status as a New
Age religious vision, it seems reasonable that these could
also be considered for their possible hermeneutical or
psychological value as such.
The work of coming to an understanding
of human spirituality that is psychologically sound,
yet that does not reduce or reject its claims, remains
challenging. Tart's (1972) and Varela's (1996) proposals
toward state-specific scholarship remains a promising
way forward, since religious teachings often derive
from experiences in nonordinary states, and spiritual
practices often cultivate such states. A state-specific
approach might be able to situate religious claims within
the context of related states of consciousness, just as
scientific knowledge might be understood as associated
with a rational cognitive state of mind. This would not
provide an ultimate solution, since the relative value of
insights from various states would necessarily remain
a topic of debate, but it might locate various types of
knowledge claims within their respective modes of
mental functioning, which at least share commonality
within the range of human experience.
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